

Message Text

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 VIENNA 2298

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: 14 MARCH EASTERN PLENARY STATEMENT

SUMMARY: FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE CZECHOSLOVAKIAN REP'S STATEMENT AT THE 14 MARCH PLENARY MEETING, CHAIRED BY THE GDR. CZECHOSLOVAK REP ARGUED FOR AN UNAMBIGUOUS STATEMENT BY THE NON-US NATO DIRECT PARTICIPANTS ON THEIR WILLINGNESS TO REDUCE THEIR FORCES FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE REDUCTION PROCESS. HE ALSO ARGUED THAT THE WESTERN USE OF THE CONCEPT OF THE "GEOGRAPHICAL DISPARITIES" IS FALSE BECAUSE THIS ALLEGED DISPARITY HAS ALREADY BEEN TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN NATO FORCE PLANNING AND HAS BEEN COMPENSATED FOR BY THE DEVELOPMENT OF US MILITARY TRANSPORT CAPABILITIES, EFFECTIVELY DISPLAYED DURING RECENT HOSTILITIES AND TRAINING EXERCISES. HE ALSO CLAIMED SOVIET TERRITORY IS WITHIN REACH OF WESTERN AIRCRAFT IN THE

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REDUCTION AREA WHILE THE TERRITORY OF THE US IS PRACTICALLY

INACCESSIBLE TO EASTERN AIRCRAFT IN THAT AREA. END SUMMARY.
BEGIN TEXT.

1. ALREADY FIVE MONTHS HAVE PASSED SINCE THE DAY WE
BEGAN THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE SUBSTANCE OF REDUCTION OF
ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND THEREBY
PROCEEDED TOWARD THE REALIZATION OF THE AIMS WE JOINTLY
DEFINED DURING THE PREPARATORY TALKS.

2. THE CZECHOSLOVAK SOCIALIST REPUBLIC, TOGETHER WITH THE OTHER
SOCIALIST COUNTRIES, HAS BEEN STRIVING FROM THE VERY BEGINNING
FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS TO BE CONDUCTED IN A CONSTRUCTIVE AND BUSINESS-
LIKE SPIRIT AND TO CONCENTRATE ON THE ESSENCE OF THE PROBLEM, WHICH
IS THE ACHIEVEMENT OF AN AGREEMENT ON REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND
ARMAMENTS IN THE AREA ALREADY AGREED.

3. THE DRAFT AGREEMENT PROPOSED AT THE BEGINNING OF THE NEGOTIATIONS
BY THE FOUR SOCIALIST COUNTRIES PRECISELY
DEFINES OUR DESIRE TO CONDUCT THE NEGOTIATIONS IN SUCH A
DIRECTION AND IN SUCH A WAY AS TO ARRIVE AT DECISIONS WHICH
WILL NOT DIMINISH THE SECURITY OF EITHER OF THE SIDES
AND WHICH WILL CONSTITUTE AN ESSENTIAL CONTRIBUTION TO THE
PROCESS OF DETENTE IN EUROPE AND IN THE WHOLE WORLD.

4. WE HAVE PROCEEDED AND CONTINUE TO PROCEED FROM
THE POSITION THAT ALL PARTICIPANTS IN OUR NEGOTIATIONS,
AND ESPECIALLY THE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS, WILL COOPERATE
IN THE ATTAINMENT OF THOSE GOALS WHICH WE DEFINED IN THE
FINAL DOCUMENTS OF THE PREPARATORY TALKS. WE ARE CONVINCED
THAT THIS MEANS THAT IT IS A QUESTION NOT ONLY OF
DISCUSSION AND OF THE SEARCH FOR PATHS TOWARD MUTUALLY
ACCEPTABLE DECISIONS. ON THE SIDE OF THE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS
THIS PRIMARILY ASSUMES A READINESS TO BE INCLUDED FROM THE
VERY BEGINNING IN THE PROCESS OF MUTUAL REDUCTION OF ARMED
FORCES AND ARMAMENTS AND THEREBY TO MAKE A CONCRETE
CONTRIBUTION TO THE MATTER THE SOLUTION OF WHICH WE JOINTLY
SEEK AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE.

5. IN THE COMMUNIQUE OF THE PREPARATORY TALKS WE CAME
TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THE SUBJECT OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS
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WOULD BE THE MUTUAL REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS
AND MEASURES ASSOCIATED WITH THIS IN CENTRAL EUROPE. THE
CONCEPT OF MUTUALITY IN OUR OPINION CANNOT BE INTERPRETED
OTHERWISE THAN IN SUCH A WAY AS TO RELATE MUTUALITY TO ALL
STATES IN OUR MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS WHICH MUST ASSUME
THE OBLIGATION DERIVING FROM THEIR STATUS AS DIRECT
PARTICIPANTS. FROM THE VERY BEGINNING OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS
THERE HAS ALSO BEEN THE QUESTION THAT IN THE CONCEPT OF

MUTUALITY ITS MAIN CONTENT WAS PRESERVED, THAT IS, THE NECESSITY FOR SIMULTANEOUS REDUCTIONS OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS OF ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS.

6. WE ARE CONVINCED THAT THESE TWO ASPECTS, I.E. MULTILATERALITY AND SIMULTANEITY ARE THE CORRECT INTERPRETATION OF THE CONCEPT OF MUTUALITY AND MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT AND ADHERED TO BOTH IN OUR NEGOTIATIONS AND IN THE CONCRETE PROPOSALS. THE DRAFT AGREEMENT OF THE FOUR SOCIALIST COUNTRIES PROCEEDS FROM THE PRINCIPLE OF MUTUALITY AND FULLY REFLECTS IT.
MR CHAIRMAN:

7. ENOUGH TIME HAS PASSED SO THAT EACH DIRECT PARTICIPANT IN OUR NEGOTIATIONS COULD REVEAL HIS ATTITUDE TO THE QUESTION OF REDUCTION. AND WHEN WE RECENTLY CALLED UPON THE SIX WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS OFFICIALLY TO EXPRESS READINESS TO BE INCLUDED IN THE PROCESS OF REDUCTION, WE DID NOT THEREBY PRESENT ANY NEW PROBLEM. WE ARE ONLY TRYING TO CLARIFY THE ATTITUDE OF EACH OF THE AFOREMENTIONED STATES TOWARD REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS, WHICH IS THE BASIC QUESTION AND THE MAIN PRECONDITION FOR THE CONDUCT OF SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS. AN UNAMBIGUOUS ANSWER FROM THE SIDE OF THE SIX WESTERN COUNTRIES WOULD INDISPUTABLY CONTRIBUTE TO FURTHER MOVEMENT IN THE SEARCH FOR GENERALLY ACCEPTABLE DECISIONS.

8. ALL THE SOCIALIST STATES WHICH ARE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS FROM THE VERY BEGINNING LEFT NO DOUBT IN ANYONE'S MIND THAT THEY INTENDED NOT ONLY TO CONSIDER THE QUESTION OF REDUCING THEIR ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS BUT ARE ALSO READY TO TAKE PRACTICAL STEPS IN THAT DIRECTION AND ASSUME THE APPROPRIATE OBLIGATIONS. NEVERTHELESS IN THE CONFIDENTIAL

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ABSENCE OF A MUTUAL APPROACH FROM THE SIDE OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES, THIS READINESS OF OURS AND OUR DISPLAY OF GOOD WILL HAS NOT LED TO POSITIVE RESULTS.

9. ONE OF THE MAIN REASONS FOR THE DIFFICULTY IN OUR SEARCH FOR POINTS OF CONTACT WHICH COULD HELP TO BRING THE TWO SIDES TOGETHER IS, WE THINK, THE FACT THAT THE WESTERN COUNTRIES HAVE NOT GIVEN A CLEAR ANSWER TO THE ABOVE-MENTIONED KEY QUESTION--I.E. THE READINESS OF ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS TO INCLUDE SIMULTANEOUSLY THEIR ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN THE PROCESS OF REDUCTION. WE SEE NO REASONS WHY AN ANSWER TO THIS BASIC QUESTION COMMON TO ALL OF US IS PUT OFF AND EVEN IGNORED.

10. INSTEAD OF OUR WESTERN PRITNERS TAKING A PRECISE

AND CLEAR POSITION ON THIS QUESTION, WE HAVE WITNESSED
ATTEMPTS TO STEER THE NEGOTIATIONS TOWARD CONSIDERATION
OF PROBLEMS WHICH DIVERT US FROM THE MAIN TASK, I.E. REDUCTION
OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS.

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MBFR NEGOTIATIONS FROM US REP MBFR

MR CHAIRMAN

11. MANY CONVINCING PROOFS HAVE ALREADY BEEN ADDUCED
HERE THAT THE APPROACH OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES TOWARD
THE SOLUTION OF THE QUESTION OF REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES
AND ARMAMENTS DOES NOT TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE INTERESTS OF
ASSURING EQUAL SECURITY FOR ALL PARTICIPANTS WITHOUT EXCEPTION.
THE MAIN DEFECT OF THE PRESENT WESTERN PROPOSALS IS MAINLY
THE FACT THAT THEY PROCEED FROM THE UNACCEPTABLE CONCEPT OF
SO-CALLED ASYMMETRICAL REDUCTION. FOLLOWING THIS CONCEPT
THE WESTERN COUNTRIES ARE TRYING IN ALL PHASES AND IN THE
PROPOSED FINAL RESULT TO GAIN UNILATERAL MILITARY ADVANTAGES

AND THEREBY CHANGE THE EXISTING BALANCE OF ARMED FORCES IN THE AREA OF CENTRAL EUROPE. IF WE WERE TO PERMIT SUCH A CHANGE IT WOULD ONLY LEAD TO A WEAKENING OF STABILITY IN THIS AREA, WHICH AT THE SAME TIME WOULD HAVE A NEGATIVE
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EFFECT ON THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF EUROPEAN STATES AND ESPECIALLY OF THE FLANK COUNTRIES.

12. THE WESTERN COUNTRIES, IN OUR OPINION, ARE DRAWING INCORRECT CONCLUSIONS AND ARE SPEAKING OF AN IMAGINARY DISPARITY OF ARMED FORCES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTION PRECISELY BECAUSE THEY ARE IGNORING A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO THE REAL RELATIONSHIP AND BECAUSE THEY ARTIFICIALLY TEAR OUT OF THE GENERAL PICTURE ONLY CERTAIN ARMED FORCES AND ONLY THEIR INDIVIDUAL COMPONENTS. THEY GIVE THESE COMPONENTS EXCESSIVE IMPORTANCE AND TREAT THEM ALMOST AS ABSOLUTE. FURTHERMORE THEY ARE BYPASSING AT THE SAME TIME OTHER ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF ARMED FORCES WHICH ARE AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE EXISTING CORRELATION OF ARMED FORCES.

13. MOREOVER, BY UNILATERALLY INTERPRETING CERTAIN FACTORS, THE WESTERN DELEGATIONS ARE TRYING TO STRENGTHEN THEIR PROPOSALS AIMED AT AN ASYMMETRICAL REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

14. FOR EXAMPLE, WE HAVE HEARD IN THE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS MANY TIMES FROM THE WESTERN DELEGATIONS ABOUT THE SO-CALLED GEOGRAPHIC FACTOR, WHICH IS ADVANCED AS AN ARGUMENT TO JUSTIFY BOTH THE GENERAL WESTERN CONCEPT OF REDUCTION AS WELL AS THE METHOD OF REDUCTION.

15. IF WE FOLLOW THE DECLARATIONS OF THE WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES ON THIS SUBJECT, ONE MIGHT GET THE IMPRESSION THAT THIS SO-CALLED GEOGRAPHIC FACTOR APPEARED ONLY IN CONNECTION WITH THE BEGINNING OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS. BUT THE FACTS ARE OTHERWISE. THIS FACTOR HAS BEEN IN EXISTENCE AND OPERATES OBJECTIVELY; ITS ESSENCE WILL NOT CHANGE EVEN AT LOWER LEVELS OF ARMED FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE. IT IS HARD TO BELIEVE THAT IT HAD NOT BEEN TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT EARLIER IN THE WHOLE SYSTEM OF THE MILITARY PLANNING OF NATO.

16. WE DID NOT INTEND TO PAY SUCH DETAILED ATTENTION TO THE SO-CALLED GEOGRAPHIC FACTOR. NEVERTHELESS, THE PERSISTENT ATTEMPTS OF THE WESTERN DELEGATIONS TO EXAGGERATE THE IMPORTANCE OF THE GEOGRAPHIC FACTOR, AND TO BASE THEIR UNFAIR PROPOSALS ON REFERENCES TO IT, FORCES US TO TOUCH
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UPON THIS QUESTION AND TO PRESENT OUR OPINION ON IT.

17. IT IS OF COURSE KNOWN TO EVERYONE THAT THE TERRITORY OF THE US LIES AT A CONSIDERABLE DISTANCE FROM EUROPE. BUT WE ARE NOT LIVING IN THE AGE OF CHRISTOPHER COLUMBUS. TODAY THERE IS ANOTHER NOTION OF SPEED, AND MEANS OF TRANSPORT CONTINUE TO DEVELOP AND BE PERFECTED.

18. IT IS WELL KNOWN THAT THE DISTANCE OF THE US FROM EUROPE HAS BEEN COMPENSATED BY TRANSPORTATION POSSIBILITIES AND BY A WELL-DEVELOPED SYSTEM OF RAPID TRANSFER OF TROOPS AND ARMAMENTS OVER LONG DISTANCES. THE CAPABILITY OF RAPID TRANSFER OF AMERICAN ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS TO EUROPE IS PERIODICALLY TESTED AND IMPROVED IN SPECIAL MILITARY EXERCISES. AT THE SAME TIME MEANS OF AIR TRANSPORT ARE CONSTANTLY BEING MODERNIZED BOTH AS REGARD SPEED, VOLUME, AND POWER AND ALSO SURFACE PROVISION OF THE AIR ROUTES. RECENT MILITARY EVENTS HAVE SHOWN THE EFFECTIVENESS AND MOBILITY OF SUCH MEANS OF TRANSFER EVEN OF HEAVY MILITARY EQUIPMENT FROM ACROSS THE OCEAN.

19. ALONG WITH OTHER MILITARY SPECIALISTS EVEN THE FORMER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE OF THE US, E. RICHARDSON, REFERRED TO THIS CAPABILITY OF RAPID ASSISTANCE TO THE ALLIES OF THE US WHEN HE DEFENDED THE DRAFT MILITARY BUDGET BEFORE CONGRESS IN APRIL 1973, SAYING " WE ALSO MAINTAIN ACTIVE AND RESERVE FORCES WHICH POSSESS FLEXIBILITY AND THE COMBAT READINESS TO BE FROUGHT EFFECTIVELY INTO A SITUATION OF A CONFLICT INVOLVING CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS."

20. BY REDUCING THE WHOLE QUESTION ONLY TO THE GEOGRAPHIC REMOTENESS OF THE TERRITORY OF THE US FROM CENTRAL EUROPE, OUR RESPECTED WESTERN COLLEAGUES ARE, IN OUR OPINION, SIMPLIFYING THE QUESTION AND ARE ISOLATING THIS FACTOR FROM OTHER FACTORS. HOWEVER THIS WHOLE QUESTION IS RATHER MORE COMPLICATED. THE FACT IS THAT BY SPEAKING OF THE INFLUENCE OF GEOGRAPHIC FACTORS, ESPECIALLY DISTANCE, ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SITUATION IN EUROPE IN CRISES, THE WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES ARE IN EFFECT TRYING TO CONSIDER THE QUESTION OF THE MOBILIZATION CAPABILITIES OF

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THE COUNTRIES OF NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT IN CENTRAL EUROPE. IT IS OUR FIRM CONVICTION THAT THIS IS NOT THE PLANE ON WHICH WE NEED TO MOVE OUR DISCUSSION. WE MUST CONCENTRATE OUR EFFORTS AND FOCUS OUR DISCUSSION ON HOW TO REDUCE

ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE, AND NOT ON HOW
TO ACCUMULATE THEM IN THIS AREA, INASMUCH AS SUCH ACTIVITY
WOULD BE IN VIOLATION OF THE AGREEMENT ON REDUCTION OF TROOPS
IN THE INDICATED ZONE.

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MBFR NEGOTIATIONS FROM US REP MBFR

21. BUT SINCE AS THIS QUESTION HAS BEEN REPEATEDLY
RAISED BY THE WESTERN DELEGATIONS, WE WOULD LIKE TO STRESS
THAT IN EXAMINING THE QUESTION OF MOBILIZATION CAPACITIES
ONE NEEDS TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT ALL FACTORS, NAMELY: THE
POPULATION OF THE COUNTRIES IN THE ZONE OF REDUCTION,
THEIR ECONOMIC AND MILITARY POTENTIAL, THE ORGANIZATIONAL
STRUCTURE OF THE ARMED FORCES, THE SYSTEM OF COMMUNICATIONS,
THE PLACES WHERE ARMS AND MILITARY SUPPLIES ARE PRODUCED, AS
WELL AS MANY OTHER FACTORS. ONE MUST NOT TAKE

22. THE DATA ON THE DIFFERENT DISTANCES OF THE US AND
THE USSR FROM THE LINE OF CONTACT IN CENTRAL EUROPE

ADVANCED IN THE ARGUMENTS OF THE WESTERN DELEGATIONS
LOOK QUITE DIFFERENT IF ONE DOES NOT LOSE SIGHT OF
THE EXISTENCE, FOR EXAMPLE, OF THE THICK NETWORK OF
MILITARY BASES OF NATO DISTRIBUTED IN PROXIMITY TO THE
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AREA OF REDUCTION. AS IS WELL KNOWN, BOTH TROOPS AND
EQUIPMENT OF THE US ARE LOCATED AT THESE BASES. THESE
COMBAT-CAPABLE ARMED FORCES CAN BE TRANSFERRED EASILY AND
QUICKLY INTO THE AREA OF CENTRAL EUROPE WITHOUT ANY
NEED TO OVERCOME THE DISTANCES MENTIONED BY THE WESTERN
DELEGATIONS. NOT TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT OR TO PAY
ATTENTION TO THIS CIRCUMSTANCE MEANS APPROACHING THE
ACTUAL SITUATION IN AN UNSERIOUS AND NON-OBJECTIVE WAY.

23. THE WESTERN PROPOSALS WHICH REFER TO THE SO-CALLED
GEOGRAPHIC FACTOR ASSUME, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT ANY WITHDRAWAL
OF AMERICAN TROOPS FROM THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS MUST, IN
CONTRAST TO THE TROOPS OF THE USSR, BE ACCOMPLISHED WITHOUT
THE RELEVANT MILITARY EQUIPMENT. TO PERMIT THE
POSSIBILITY OF KEEPING THIS MILITARY EQUIPMENT IN
EUROPE ALONG WITH THE FULL EQUIPMENT OF ALMOST THREE
US DIVISIONS, NOW STORED IN THE FRG, WOULD LEAD ONLY TO
ITS FURTHER CONCENTRATION IN THIS AREA AND TO INCREASING
THE POSSIBILITY OF ITS RAPID USE.

24. IN ADDITION TO THESE COMMENTS TESTIFYING TO THE FACT
THAT THE WESTERN DELEGATIONS ARE BASING THEMSELVES ONLY
ON THE GEOGRAPHIC FACTOR AND ARE NOT TAKING INTO ACCOUNT
OTHER FEATURES, ONE CAN ALSO OFFER OTHER FACTORS
AGAINST A UNILATERAL AND SIMPLIFIED INTERPRETATION OF
THIS QUESTION. ONE SHOULD, FOR EXAMPLE, TAKE INTO
CONSIDERATION THE STOCKS OF AMERICAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS,
ESPECIALLY ON THE TERRITORY OF THE FRG, AND MILITARY
UNITS AND SUBUNITS FOR THEIR USE, WHICH, ACCORDING TO
THE WESTERN SCHEME, MUST REMAIN OUTSIDE THE FRAMEWORK
OF REDUCTION. IT IS APPROPRIATE WHEN SPEAKING OF THE
DISTANCE OF THE US AND THE USSR FROM THE ZONE OF REDUCTIONS
TO PAY ATTENTION ALSO TO THE FOLLOWING CONSIDERATION.
ACTUALLY THE TERRITORY OF THE USSR IS MUCH CLOSER TO
THE ZONE OF REDUCTION, BUT CONNECTED WITH THIS THERE
ARE OTHER CONSIDERATIONS OF A MILITARY-STRATEGIC NATURE
ABOUT WHICH THE WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES DO NOT SPEAK. IF,
FOR EXAMPLE, WE CONSIDER THE COMBAT CAPABILITIES OF THE
AIRCRAFT LOCATED IN THE ZONE OF REDUCTION, IT IS OBVIOUS
THAT THEIR PROXIMITY TO THE TERRITORY OF THE USSR CREATES
DEFINITE ADVANTAGES FOR THE WESTERN COUNTRIES, INASMUCH
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AS THE TERRITORY OF THE US IS PRACTICALLY INACCESSIBLE
TO AIRCRAFT LOCATED IN THE ZONE OF REDUCTION.

MR CHAIRMAN:

25. IN SUMMING UP, WE WOULD LIKE TO NOTE THE FOLLOWING:
THE ATTEMPTS OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES TO BASE THEIR
PROPOSALS ON AN UNEQUAL REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES OF THE
SOCIALIST STATES BY REFERENCES TO A GEOGRAPHIC FACTOR
CANNOT BE REGARDED AS JUSTIFIED. THE WESTERN
DELEGATIONS USE THIS FACTOR, IGNORING OTHER FACTORS
IMPORTANT TO THE EXAMINATION OF THE PROBLEM AT HAND.
THIS IS UNFAIR FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF AN OBJECTIVE
ANALYSIS OF THE PROBLEM. FURTHERMORE, BY USING ONLY
ONE FACTOR, THE DELEGATIONS OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES
ARE STRIVING TO GAIN UNILATERAL MILITARY ADVANTAGES,
WHICH CONTRADICTS THE PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY
FOR EACH OF THE SIDES.

26. MOREOVER, THE ATTEMPTS OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES
TO CONCENTRATE ATTENTION ON THE POSSIBILITY OF A RAPID
REINTRODUCTION AND REINFORCEMENT OF TROOP UNITS IN THE
PROPOSED AREA OF REDUCTIONS CONTAIN THE THOUGHT OF THE
POSSIBILITY OF A FUTURE MILITARY CONFRONTATION. SUCH
AN APPROACH IN EFFECT PROCEEDS FROM THE POSSIBILITY OF
AN EVASION OR EVEN OF A VIOLATION OF THE AGREEMENT ON
ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS.

27. THE SOCIALIST STATES ASSUME, ON THE OTHER HAND,
THAT OUR NEGOTIATIONS MUST LEAD TO AN AGREEMENT WHICH
WILL BE OBSERVED BY ALL. THIS AGREEMENT MUST PROMOTE
THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE GENERAL PROCESS OF DETENTE,
WHICH EXCLUDES THE SOLUTION OF DISPUTES BY FORCE.

28. THEREFORE, INSTEAD OF CONSIDERING HOW, AND WITH
WHAT SPEED AND BY WHAT MEANS MILITARY UNITS MAY BE
RETURNED TO THE AREA OF CENTRAL EUROPE, WE SHOULD
CONCENTRATE OUR ATTENTION ON WORKING OUT A MUTUALLY
ACCEPTABLE STABLE AGREEMENT ON THE REDUCTION OF ARMED
FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN THE INDICATED ZONE.

29. THE CZECHOSLOVAK DELEGATION IS READY TO SEEK PATHS
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IN THAT DIRECTION TO FULFILL OUR COMMON DIFFICULT TASK.
WE ARE CONVINCED THAT WITH A REALISTIC APPROACH TO
THE EVALUATION OF THE SITUATION AND THE BASIC PREMISES
OF OUR WORK WE WILL SUCCEED IN OVERCOMING THE STILL

EXISTING DIFFERENCES AND ACHIEVE PROGRESS IN OUR
NEGOTIATIONS. END TEXT.HUMES

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